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“Constructs are the central means we have for connecting the operations used in a [study] to pertinent
theory... [and] mislabelings often have serious implications for either theory or practice.”
—Shadish et al. (2002, p. 65, 71)
Analyses should logically ensue from the data on which they are based (Morely et al., 2001).
When such data are mislabeled (whether knowingly or not) and, in turn, research findings are
misconstrued, the integrity of a discipline’s knowledge base is compromised and scientific progress
may be delayed, as future investigations in a topic area are misdirected and resources are wasted
pursuing false leads (Stroebe et al., 2012). Moreover, as has become increasingly evident, publicity
surrounding such mislabeling, and the ensuing findings, has invariably eroded public trust in
science (Ioannidis, 2012). Construct labeling within the scientific community is, thus, a serious
matter that requires action.
One among many examples of construct mislabeling is a recent paper, “How Much (More)
Should CEOsMake? AUniversal Desire forMore Equal Pay,” Kiatpongsan andNorton (2014) claim
to have compared people’s estimates of chief executive officer and unskilled worker actual wages to
their ideal for what those wages should be1. Kiatpongsan and Norton base their actual and ideal
wage comparisons on four items taken from the 2009 International Social Survey Programme: Social
Inequality IV (ISSP Research Group, 2012). The ISSP Social Inequality module was administered
to 55,659 respondents from 41 countries between February 2009 and November 2010. A review
focusing specifically on the data collected in the United States, however, reveals that Kiatpongrsan
and Norton’s wage-comparison analysis rests on a mislabeling of its inherent core constructs: viz.,
people’s estimates of the wage disparities between what CEOs and unskilled workers are actually
paid vis-à-vis people’s ideal wage differential.
Data
Kiatpongsan and Norton base their actual and ideal wage comparisons on four items taken
from the US version of the ISSP Social Inequality survey. The items, which are not reproduced
in Kiatpongsan and Norton’s paper, read: (i) “How much do you think a chairman of a large
national corporation earns?” (emphasis added) (ii) “How much do you think an unskilled worker
in a factory earns?” (emphasis added) and (iii) “How much do you think a chairman of a
large national company should earn?” (emphasis added) and (iv) How much do you think
an unskilled worker in a factory should earn?” (emphasis added). Survey respondents were
1This example was not selected to necessarily single out Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014) individually, but was selected given
its recency and the public-policy importance income equality has already taken in the early weeks in the run-up to the 2016
United States Presidential elections (see, e.g.,: The Hillary pay ratio, 2015, April 15). Other earlier examples of the same
mislabeling discussed in the present paper, see: Andersen and Yaish (2012, pp. 16–17), Jasso and Meyersson Milgrom (2008,
p. 127) and Osberg and Smeeding (2006, Table 5, Footnote e, p. 465). Other more general examples of mislabeling involve
the functional distinctiveness of the dimensions underlying burnout and engagement (Cole et al., 2012) and the empirical
redundancy of job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Le et al., 2010). An anonymous referee has also suggested
that, beyond construct labeling, scientific progress within a discipline is also hampered by problems in construct development.
For more on this latter point, see: Shadish et al. (2002).
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advised that “[m]any people are not exactly sure about this, but
your best guess will be close enough.”
Methodology
To compare the respondents’ actual and ideal estimates of chief
executive officers’ and unskilled workers’ wages, Kiatpongsan and
Norton calculated two pay ratios. They computed an estimated
actual CEO-to-unskilled worker pay ratio was by dividing the
respondents’ estimated actual chairmen pay (Item i) by their
estimated actual unskilled factory worker pay (Item ii). Similarly,
Kiatpongsan and Norton divided the respondents’ estimated
ideal chairmen pay (Item iii) by their estimated ideal unskilled
factory worker pay (Item iv) to create an estimated ideal CEO-to-
unskilled worker pay ratio. In generating both ratios, Kiatpongsan
and Norton used median rather than mean values because
the respondents’ actual and ideal earnings estimates were non-
normally distributed. In such situations, the median is more
representative of an underlying data distribution’s center or, in
the present instance, the point about which the respondents’
actual and ideal estimates tended to cluster.
Results
In presenting the results of their wage comparisons, Kiatpongsan
and Norton reported that American respondents’ estimated
actual ratio of CEO to unskilled worker pay (30:1) exceeded their
estimated ideal ratio (7:1). They then “compared the estimated
pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers with the actual pay ratio
for the 16 countries where data on actual pay ratios are available”
(emphasis added; p. 589). Relying on data from the AFL-CIO’s
(2013) Executive Paywatch website, which Kiatpongsan and
Norton state shows that, in 2012, “the ratio of the pay of an
average chief executive officer (CEO) to an average employee in the
United States” was 354:1 (emphasis added; p. 587), Kiatpongsan
and Norton concluded that American respondents “drastically
underestimated the gap in actual incomes between CEOs and
unskilled workers” (emphasis added; p. 589), as their estimated
actual ratio (30:1) “far exceeded” their estimated ideal ratio (7:1;
p. 587).
Construct Labeling
A review of the data on which Kiatpongsan and Norton’s
analysis rests, however, casts doubt on their findings. Most
obviously, the four ISSP survey items that formed the basis for
Kiatpongsan and Norton’s “estimated” and “ideal” pay ratios
asked respondents what they thought a Chairman of a large
national company/corporation and an unskilled factory worker
should earn and not what they thought an average CEO or
an average employee should earn. Although in some instances
the same person may serve as both a company’s chairman
and CEO, the jobs are not the same. Indeed, in the United
States, some 47 percent of S&P 500 companies operate with
separate chairmen and CEOs (Spencer Stuart Inc, 2014, p.
23). Similarly, Kiatpongsan and Norton’s use of the terms
“average employee” and “unskilled factory worker” as if they are
synonymous is puzzling. Discussing pay ratios in the United
States, the AFL-CIO’s (2013) Executive Paywatch website uses
neither term, preferring the broader trade-union designation
“rank-and-file worker,” a more encompassing classification than
unskilled worker in a factory, as used in ISSP Items (ii) and (iv)
above.
Further germane to Kiatpongsan and Norton’s conflating
of the chairman and CEO roles is the large difference in
compensation typically paid executives who hold the combined
positions of CEO and chairman and those who serve as a
chairman only. In 2012, for the 180 North American companies
each with market capitalization of $20 billion or more, non-CEO
chairmen earned a median $492,259 annually as compared with
$16,079,480 for CEOs who also served as chairmen (Hodgson
and Ruel, 2012). Given this contrast in earnings, and the clear
wording of ISSP Items (i) and (iii), Kiatpongsan and Norton’s
decision to set aside the established distinction between a CEO
and a chairman is a mislabeling that, as the opening Shadish et al.
(2002) epigram has theoretical and practical implications.
At a deeper level, Kiatpongsan and Norton’s use of the AFL-
CIO’s (2013) Executive Paywatch data on the ratio of CEO to
worker pay in the United States involves a further instance of
mislabeling. The Executive Paywatch website clearly states that
this ratio is “based on [an] AFL-CIO analysis of average CEO pay
at 327 companies in the S&P 500 Index, which disclosed 2012
CEO pay data as of April 1, 2013.” Simply put, the ratio does
not represent the pay differential between an average CEO and an
average employee in the United States as Kiatpongsan and Norton
state. Moreover, this ratio was calculated not by comparing, in the
words of Kiatpongsan and Norton, the “incomes of CEO[s] to
unskilled workers in the United States” (p. 592; emphasis added),
but by contrasting the reported average pay of the 327 S&P CEOs
for whom data were collected (viz., $12,259,894 annually) with
what the AFL-CIO characterized as the “average wages of rank-
and-file U. S. workers in 2012” (viz., $34,645 annually)2 . Thus,
in effect, the 354:1 pay ratio Kiatpongsan and Norton use in
their analysis is actually a comparison of the average annual pay
received by a convenience sample of S&P CEOs with the average
yearly earnings of all rank-and-file U. S. workers for 2012, and
not, as they contend, the “incomes of CEO[s] to unskilledworkers
[factory or otherwise] in the United States.”
Summary
A study’s conclusions may be open to alternative interpretations,
but the constructs on which the interpretations are based must
be faithfully represented. This is especially true in instances
where researchers, such as Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014),
intend for their findings to guide “policymakers seeking to
understand lay attitudes toward income inequality” (p. 592).
Viewed more widely, if as a scientific community, we seek to
intensify the dialog between academics and policymakers and
2Given the information provided, I was unable to locate the Bureau of Labor
Statistics table the AFL-CIO’s Executive Paywatch website footnotes as the source
for the $34,645 figure given as the “average wages of rank-and-file U. S. workers.”
This figure, however, appears to have been calculated by multiplying $666.25
(the BLS’s seasonally adjusted, preliminary estimate of the “average hourly and
weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm
payrolls by industry sector, seasonally adjusted” for July, 2012) times 52 salary
weeks or $666.25 52 = $34,645 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
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to promote the application of rigorous empirical research to
public and private sector policy and practice, the manner in
which constructs in a study are connected to theory is essential
for maintaining our discipline’s scientific credibility. Maintaining
public trust is likewise essential for securing confidence among
the broader population in our capacity to recommend solutions
to unresolved social challenges. Simply stated, if we wish to
influence policymakers and the lay-public to use our findings,
our analyses should logically represent the data on which they
are based.
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